The State of AI Agent Supply-Chain Trust (2026)

June 21, 2026 · 8 min read · HVTracker Research

2026 was the year AI agents stopped being demos and started being dependencies — wired into CI pipelines, handed cloud credentials, and granted tool access to real systems. It was also the year supply-chain attackers noticed. So we asked a simple question: how verifiable is the open-source AI agent ecosystem, really?

We graded 272 open-source AI agents on public, checkable supply-chain signals — build provenance, package provenance, signed commits, OSSF Scorecard, license, and maintenance — and rolled them into an evidence grade from A to D. Here's the picture.

13%
earn an evidence grade of A
43%
land at grade D
17%
publish build provenance
5.3
median OSSF Scorecard (of 10)

The grade distribution

Evidence grade reflects how much of a project's trust can be independently verified from public data — not a verdict on whether it's "good" software. On that axis, the ecosystem is bottom-heavy.

GradeAgentsShare 
A3513%
B6524%
C5621%
D11643%

The provenance gap is the headline

The single most consequential finding: only 47 of 272 agents (17%) publish any build provenance. Of the 170 agents published to a package registry, 72% ship no package provenance, and 20% of all agents have zero signed commits. As the 2026 TrapDoor and TanStack/Mistral campaigns showed, build provenance is the one signal that makes registry injection detectable — and most of the ecosystem can't offer it.

Why this matters more for agents. A compromised library leaks data. A compromised agent acts — it runs code, calls tools, and increasingly spends money on your behalf. The blast radius of an unverifiable build scales with how much authority you've delegated, and in 2026 that's a lot.

The top 10 by HVTrust

The highest-ranked agents share a profile: they publish provenance, sign commits, and score above the median on OSSF Scorecard. Popularity is conspicuously absent from that list — these rank on verifiability, not stars.

#AgentGradeOSSF
1HaystackA8.4
2LangGraphA6.8
3n8nA6.6
4CodexA6.6
5Vercel AI SDKA6.4
6ClineA6.0
7OpenAI Agents SDKA6.3
8PydanticAIA6.1
9LiveKit AgentsA6.7
10MLflowA5.6

MCP is now mainstream — and mostly unverifiable

45% of the agents we track now implement or declare a Model Context Protocol server, the interface that lets agents broker your credentials and tools. Of those, 76% ship no build provenance — meaning the components most likely to be granted system access are, as a group, among the hardest to verify. We dug into this in a separate report on MCP servers and trust.

What we measured (and what we didn't)

HVTrust is built from public, reproducible signals: OSSF Scorecard, build and package provenance, signed-commit ratio, license, maintenance freshness, and adoption — scaled by how much checkable evidence exists. Every number on every profile links back to its source.

What it is not is a judgment of code quality or capability. A high grade means a project does the boring, verifiable security work and you can confirm it; a low grade means a gap in public evidence, not a proven risk. Some signals reward newer practices like provenance, which can understate older but well-run projects. We publish the full methodology and the underlying data under CC BY 4.0 so you can check or rebuild any of this yourself.

Explore the full registry

All 272 agents, every signal, refreshed throughout the day. Free, open data, no signup.

Browse the trust registry

Data from HVTracker signals as of June 21, 2026. Figures are a point-in-time snapshot and shift as the registry refreshes. Full methodology · Download the data. Related reports: MCP servers and trust · provenance vs. the 2026 attacks.